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Abstract: The dilemma of the anthropos confuses him as to the 
advantage of the market to his existence. The market anthropos is seen 
as homo economicus, a self-interested, utility-maximizing individual. 
This popular belief is critically analyzed as to its nuances insofar as 
the homo politicus of John Rawls is concerned. The life of the market 
anthropos seeks consensus towards societal cooperation and justice. 
Popularly held to be dissenting, this paper seeks to explore their 
possible convergence in the light of the nuances predicated by Adam 
Smith and Rawls. Ultimately, it is argued that the anthropos in either 
startum of politics or market is not differentiated but is one and the 
same, contextually apart but anthropologically integrated. The 
cooperative homo politicus can also be a cooperative homo econonomicus 
just as both can be selfishly motivated and utilitarianist. 
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ny attempt at reconstructing “economic liberalism” cannot but 
include the theory of “political liberalism,”1 understood as a school 
of thought associated with the argument of “embracing a 
conception of justice that seeks consensus on a framework for regulating 
and mediating only the political.”2 The core idea talks about striving for a 
kind of “consensus through reduction”3 amidst the context of conflicting 
and differentiated religious, philosophical and social norms and principles. 
This claim, however, is never new. Such “consensus through reduction” of 
                                                 
1 The term political liberalism was actually first introduced by John Rawls in his 1987 
article “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 7:1 (1987), 1-
25. 
2 Shaun P. Young, “The Concept of Political Liberalism,” in Political Liberalism: 
Variations on a Theme (USA: State University of New York Press, 2004), 3. 
3 Rainer Frost, “Foreword,” in Ibid., ix. 
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variants of conflicting narratives is already found in several historical 
discourses, even much older than liberalism itself.4 What is new, however, is 
Rawl’s version of it—the “political” consensus that binds the members of a 
liberal political community together is not just devoid of religious meaning 
but is also no longer committed to a “comprehensive moral doctrine.”5 It is a 
liberal project that is seen as a culmination of the history of countless 
attempts to establish political unity in ethical differences, anchored on 
common principles of justice to be “freestanding”6 and binding in all 
relevant cases of conflict and to take priority over rival conceptions of the 
just or the good. A clear demarcation line is herein understood between 
justice and the good—the price liberalism has to pay for solving the great 
problem of e pluribus unum.  Ingenuous as it is, Rawls at one point 
wondered why such breakthrough idea/theory has not been found earlier.7 
It is clear for Rawls—his justice as fairness is political and not 
metaphysical.8 It is anchored on the context of society and that social unity 
is understood in the very concept of society as a system of cooperation 
between free and equal persons. The persons in Rawls’ society, usually 
referred to as citizens,9 do not altogether affirm the same conception of good 
but publicly accept a political conception of justice to regulate the basic 
structure of society. The concept of justice is independent from and prior to 
the concept of goodness in the sense that its principles limit the conceptions 
of the good, which are permissible.10 In the formation of a stable society, 
diverse groups/individuals set the minimum (and therefore basic) 
requirements for stability in the spirit of what is just (and fair) to all 
stakeholders; only after then is categorization of what is good (sentiments) 
allowed. The primacy of the criteria understood in terms of justice provides 
                                                 
4 “…There is Peter Abelard’s attempt to identify a ‘natural’ core morality common to 
believers of different faiths, in Nicholas of Cusa’s conception of una religio in rituum varietate  or 
in Erasmus of Rotterdam’s universal Christiana philosophia…” Ibid. 
5 It is defined as a ‘moral ideal to govern all of life’. John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: 
Political not Metaphysical,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14:3 (1985), 245. 
6 By ‘freestanding,’ it means independent and yet acceptable from the point of view 
of plurality of incompatible comprehensive doctrines. Frost, “Foreword,” x. 
7 See John Rawls, “Reply to Habermas,” in Journal of Philosophy, 92:3 (1995), 133. 
8 “Thus the aim of justice as fairness as a political conception is practical, and not 
metaphysical or epistemological. That is, it presents itself not as a conception of justice that is 
true, but one that can serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between 
citizens viewed as free and equal persons.” Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not 
Metaphysical,” 230. 
9 “Since Greek times, both in philosophy and law, the concept of the person has been 
understood as the concept of someone who can take part in, or who can play a role in, social 
life, and hence exercise and respect its various rights and duties. Thus we say that a person is 
someone who can be a citizen, that is, a fully cooperating member of society over a complete 
life.” Ibid., 233. 
10 Ibid., 249. 
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the basic foundation of stable society while the criteria set forth in terms of 
good are contingent upon its contribution to stability of society, henceforth, 
secondary. 
 
Rawlsian Justice as a Moral Concept 
 
While it is clearly explicit that Rawls’ political concept of justice as 
fairness is in the context of superiority of justice over good, or what he 
termed as “priority of right,”11 he still maintains that his concept of justice is 
a “moral conception.” 
 
…Justice as fairness is a moral conception: it has 
conceptions of the person and society, and concepts of 
right and fairness, as well as principles of justice with 
their complement of the virtues through which those 
principles are embodied in human character and 
regulate political and social life. This conception of 
justice provides an account of the cooperative virtues 
suitable for a political doctrine in view of the conditions 
and requirements of a constitutional regime. 12 
 
Many after Rawls referred to such as the “paradox of political 
liberalism.”13 The paradox is that the conception must not be a moral one. 
For Rawls, however, there is no contradiction as moral conception of justice 
as fairness merely refers to inclusion of the “conceptions of person and 
society, of right and fairness, as well as principles of justice with their 
complementary virtues through which those principles are embodied in 
human character and regulate political and social life.”14 The moral 
conception of Rawlsian justice does not reject values attached to moral as 
completely alien and therefore separated from the very concept of 
right/justice. This is the mistake of those who find the moral character of 
justice as an oxymoron of sort, due of course to their absolute categorization 
of moral and political as not only opposite but relatively hostile to one 
another. For Rawls, there are shades of gray. It was and has never been a 
                                                 
11 “Elsewhere I have called this relation between a conception of justice and 
conceptions of the good the priority of right (since the just falls under the right).” Ibid., 250. 
12 Ibid., 247. 
13 “… The Rawlsian theory fails to explain the normative character of this kind of 
moral conception, for it seems that the political conception can be acceptable in an overlapping 
consensus only if it is precisely not itself a moral conception but only becomes one in the eyes 
of the different comprehensive doctrines, being dependent upon their particular affirmation.” 
Frost, “Foreword,” xi. 
14 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” 247. 
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black and white demarcation. It is more understood in a qualified and 
conditional sense—on the condition that such conception of justice provides 
an account of the cooperative virtues suitable for a political doctrine.15 This is 
more technically referred to by Rawls as “overlapping consensus.”16  
The issue of poverty in the Philippine society serves as a fertile 
illustration. Various groups have already proposed solutions to address this 
social problem. There are those who start the poverty alleviation project 
from the standpoint of population control, best identified with the 
proponents of the Reproductive Health (RH) bill. Some blame it on the 
inefficient government plagued by institutionalized practice of graft and 
corruption, best identified with civic groups like Bayan Muna, Anakpawis, 
among others. Still others see it as implications of an ineffective educational 
system producing more social liabilities than assets. Another position claims 
that it is due to lack of (quality) employment opportunities, caused by weak 
business climate for both domestic and foreign investments owing to poor 
security measures to maintain peace and order. Finally, one may contend 
the problem of poverty is deeply cultural and may even be religiously 
instigated or historically and culturally conditioned.17 All these are variants 
of comprehensive views that contain answers to the difficult and 
controversial issue of poverty in the Philippines. At some point of 
divergence, convergence is possible. At some point, people should be able to 
consent to their political arrangements, understood and accepted by each 
member of society, according to the dictates of his or her own reason. This is 
what is meant by the normative character of Rawls’ overlapping consensus 
– diverse people at some point can agree on identifying principles to 
contribute to social stability.18 In the context of diversity, justice as fairness 
calls every stakeholder to a consensus that poverty should be alleviated as it 
is not fair for other members of society to suffer while the rest enjoy. In this 
sense, stability is achieved, somehow.  
The proviso for a moral conception of Rawlsian justice is hereby 
deemed important in this discursive exploration of anthropos in economic 
liberalism. The basic assumption is that if political liberalism situates the 
                                                 
15 Italics emphasized. Ibid. 
16 “Briefly, Rawls argues that in spite of their [different comprehensive views] 
important differences, people who subscribe to diverse comprehensive views are able to agree 
in regard to a range of issues and principles bearing on society’s basic institutions. Though 
people will support these principles for different reasons, with those of each person stemming 
from his or her own comprehensive view, the area of agreement throughout society will be 
sufficiently broad to contribute to the stability of liberal societies.” George Klosko, “An 
Empirical Approach to Political Liberalism,” in Political Liberalism: Variations on a Theme, 130. 
17 For a detailed reference on this, see Asian Development Bank, Poverty in the 
Philippines: Causes, Constraints, and Opportunities (Mandaluyong City: ADB, 2009), 39-52. 
18  John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 3-4. 
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anthropos as an essential, if not primordial, agent in the formation of stable 
society, given of course the anthropos’ societal situation of deep divisions 
between opposing and incommensurable conceptions of the good, then 
there is no reason to suspect that the homo politicus of Rawls, while 
fundamentally political, is capable of moral powers in the context of socially 
cooperative and free democratic society.  
Justice as fairness starts from the idea that society is to be conceived 
as a fair system of cooperation and so it adopts a conception of the person to 
go with this idea.  Here the focus shifts to the anthropos of political 
liberalism—its character, dynamics, and most importantly, its ethical/moral 
dimension—in the context of Rawls’ diverse liberal societies. In this paper, 
the political anthropos is to be referred to as homo politicus. 
 
Semantic Nuances of Homo Politicus 
 
Before exploring the disposition of homo politicus, it is worth delving 
on some interesting yet puzzling discoveries of the term at least in the 
archaeological sense. First, while common impression holds that this 
concept of homo politicus is original to Rawls, it is not. It antedates even one 
of his early articles, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical” in 1985. 
In the said article, Rawls mentions the term in discussion as something that 
has already been in the circle of scholarship: “There are, of course, many 
aspects of human nature that can be singled out as especially significant 
depending on our point of view. This is witnessed by such expressions as 
homo politicus, homo oeconomicus, homo faber, and the like.”19 It therefore 
appears that the term has indeed already been relatively established.  
Second, the semantic quandary is even bolstered by the discovery 
that homo politicus is generally credited by many scholars to Karine Nyborg20  
and Bruce Carruthers,21 working along the lines of ecological economics and 
sociology, respectively. What is, however, confusing here is that their 
“original” use of homo politicus appeared in their articles printed in the year 
2000 and 1994, respectively. If Rawls mentioned this term in his 1985 article, 
why would the credit be given to them whose assumed original use was 
years after the former? The presumption is that the term has already been 
                                                 
19 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” 232. 
20 Karine Nyborg, “Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus: Interpretation and 
Aggregation of Environmental Values,” in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 42:3 
(2000), 305-22. 
21 Bruce G. Carruthers, “Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus: Non-Economic 
Rationality in the Early 18th Century London Stock Market,” in Acta Sociologica, 37:2 (1994), 165-
94. 
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there all along but has never been fully and scholarly defined until Nyborg 
and Carruthers did.  
Third, the concept of homo politicus, at least in the articles of both 
Nyborg and Carruthers, was often utilized as a conversant of homo 
economicus although understood in different capacities. For Nyborg, the 
homo politicus is offered as antithesis (protagonist) to homo economicus 
(antagonist).22 For Carruthers, meanwhile, there is convergence and oneness 
of existence for both homo economicus and homo politicus. “Economic action in 
this market was embedded in politics and ethnicity, and homo economicus 
was also homo politicus….Homo economicus and homo politicus were in the 
market together.”23 
Fourth, it may be argued that the use of homo politicus in this 
discourse to refer to the anthropos may be completely arbitrary and, 
therefore, may not correspond to the “original” spirit of such term, taken of 
course in the sense as used by both Nyborg and Carruthers. This is, 
however, to be refuted as both of them understood the term in the context of 
what Rawls considered as the function and locus of his political anthropos— 
as an individual in pursuit of “political justice” in the context of stable 
society. “The homo politicus is based on ethical considerations essentially 
characterized by its ‘striving for political justice’. It recognizes this striving 
as an essential trait of its existence as a being capable of reason….”24 
 
Homo Politicus as a Moral Anthropos: The Two Moral Powers 
 
There is indeed justification for the decision to articulate the 
political anthropos of Rawls as homo politicus. After settling what may be 
considered as nuances of meaning and semantics, it is important now to 
define the identity of this homo politicus in Rawlsian world with particular 
emphasis on its moral capacity.  
The starting point of Rawls’ thesis is the recognition of the diversity 
present in any liberal society, characterized as “unbridgeable” and thereby 
inherent.25 The permanent stamp of such diversity is drawn from an 
acknowledgment of fundamental disagreements among people 
emphasizing different aspects of questions and employing different 
                                                 
22 See Malte Faber et al., “Homo Oeconomicus and Homo Politicus in Ecological 
Economics,” in Ecological Economics, 40 (2002), 326. See also Robert A. Young, Determining the 
Economic Value of Water: Concepts and Methods (USA: Resources for the Future Press, 2005), 147. 
23 Carruthers, “Homo Economicus and Homo Politicus: Non-Economic Rationality in 
the Early 18th Century London Stock Market,” 166. 
24 Christian Becker, “The Human Actor in Ecological Economics: Philosophical 
Approach and Research Perspectives,” in Ecological Economics, 60 (2006), 19. 
25 Klosko, “An Empirical Approach to Political Liberalism,” 130. 
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methods of investigation, resulting in various and irreconcilable answers.26  
With objective towards a stable society characterized by social unity, 
without of course denying its recognized diversity, Rawls sees the need for 
a kind of consensus that may overlap among the “fragmented” differences.27 
With consensus, it necessitates the presence of a fully cooperating member 
of society. Henceforth, the homo politicus for Rawls is briefly defined as “full 
participants in a fair system of social cooperation, with capacity for two 
moral powers connected with the elements of social cooperation: a capacity 
for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good.”28 Here 
these two morals as capacities for a full cooperating homo politicus need 
further exposition. 
For Rawls, the sense of justice is the capacity to understand, apply, 
and act in terms of a generally approved conception of justice that 
characterizes the fair terms of social cooperation.29 It is simply to choose the 
course of action that is aligned with the social contract agreed upon by a 
general account of all homines politici. In this case, it may refer to the law of 
the land implemented by the state in minimalist sense that is good enough 
for a just and fair exercise for social cooperation. The traffic law and 
regulations implemented in Metro Manila require all in the area to 
cooperate so as to maintain stability in society. That is a minimum 
requirement understood in the conception of political justice. On the other 
hand, Rawls’ conception of the good allows the homo politicus “to form, 
revise, and rationally pursue one’s rational advantage, or good.”30 This 
concerns the creative capacity of the homo politicus, understood not in 
egoistic term but on the conception of what is valuable in human life—
transcending the law beyond its letter and realizing specific ends for their 
own sake as well as of attachments to other persons, groups, and 
associations. These attachments give rise to flourishing of the persons and 
associations as objects of the sentiments of affections and devotions. While 
to obey the traffic law maintains stability in society, this conception of the 
good allows some forms of modification from the rigor of the law, not for 
the sake of narrow interest but still for the promotion of social stability. 
Take the case, for example, of approved exemptions in traffic laws like 
                                                 
26 “Rawls calls this fact of human reason the ‘burdens of judgment,’ and he argues 
that a diversity of doctrines is a permanent feature of liberal public culture, not an accident of 
history, destined to pass away.” Ibid. 
27 “Justice as fairness seeks to identify the kernel of an overlapping consensus, that is 
the shared intuitive ideas which when worked up into a political conception of justice turn out 
to be sufficient to underwrite a just constitutional regime.” Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political 
not Metaphysical,” 246. 
28 Ibid., 233. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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emergency privilege of priority pass to ambulances, fire trucks, and police 
cars, among others. Such case of tolerance does not destroy the conception 
of justice as it even promotes dynamism in an already stable society—if and 
only if such exemption is still warranted by the consensus of all. 
 
The Homo Politicus as an Anthropos for Freedom and Equality 
 
Aside from the two moral powers for the conception of justice and 
good, it is also assumed that the conception of the political anthropos 
necessitates as basic intuitive idea its being free and equal. This is part of 
Rawls’ proposed solution to both the liberal critique of aristocracy and the 
socialist critique of liberal constitutional democracy. There is, however, a 
need to clarify still the nature of the political anthropos as free in order to 
transcend the metaphysical ambiguity that surrounds the concept of 
freedom in the classical times. For Rawls, the homo politicus views himself as 
free in three respects: 1) having moral power to conceive the good, 2) 
capacitated as a self-originating source of valid claims, and 3) capable of 
being responsible for his actions.31 From this, it is evident that although the 
homo politicus is understood initially by Rawls as a mere member/unit of the 
desired stable and democratic society, his thesis on justice as fairness as the 
core of such overlapping consensus legitimates the primordial status and 
role of his political anthropos in the formation and maintenance of social 
unity and cooperation. Hence, the homo politicus is not only a unit of society 
but a self-determining person capable of not only the conception of justice 
but also of the good. The homo politicus is primarily a person understood 
with moral powers to initiate actions based on personal choices, however, 
understood not in mere narrow self-interest but still for what is of value to 
the life of the political anthropos. Briefly assumed thereon, the homo politicus 
is a person who is capable of extending beyond the rigor by the capacity for 
revision and formation of relationships, sentiments, loyalties—sufficient 
environment for a feasible praxis of compassion. Indeed, the homo politicus 
can be compassionate. 
 
Economic Anthropos: The Case of Homo Economicus 
 
The focus now shifts to the economic anthropos herein to be referred 
as homo economicus. Just as homo politicus in this discussion has been found to 
include some sort of confusion in its archeological sense, the concept of homo 
economicus is no different.32 It has been generally associated with Adam 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 240-244. 
32 Edward O’Boyle attempts to trace the origin, as any archeologist does, by whose 
earliest hand this expression came into use. Such attempt is not easy. In the end, he is led to 
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Smith, not because the exact expression is found in any of his great works, 
but because it is mainly due to the idea and thought that has since defined 
the character of homo economicus as such—self-interested and utility-
maximizing individual who cares not about anything else but himself—a 
character of the economic anthropos that is inscribed in Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations,33 considered as his magnum opus. 
 
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but 
from their regard to their own interest. We address 
ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love, 
and never talk to them of our own necessities but of 
their advantages.34  
 
The popular consensus then reveals an egoistic anthropos35—
someone who is judged to be concerned with nothing about the concept of 
“helping” for the cause of others except only if by doing so, it would reap 
him/her increased profit and reward. Much criticized in the “shortcomings” 
of homo economicus, it is believed to be a case of oversimplification as there 
are findings that reveal a social sense (altruism, sympathy) that can be 
deemed congruent if not inherent to the person of the homo economicus.36 
Herein rests the central issues that must be addressed for the 
concept of homo economicus. What nuances are inherent in the nature of homo 
economicus as a self-interested anthropos? If homo economicus carries with it a 
popular connotation of a self-interested, calculating and therefore egoistic 
anthropos, what degree of confluence, if ever feasible, can such individual 
exercise in his meeting with the homo politicus, understood as a more 
                                                                                                                  
assume that the full expression of the term originated from German-language economics 
literature but still without finality due to his unfamiliarity with the German language. See 
Edward J. O’Boyle, “The Origins of Homo Economicus: A Note,” Unpublished paper (Louisiana: 
Mayo Research Institute, 2008). 
33 Published in 1776, it bears the original title An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of 
the Wealth of Nations. Usually abbreviated as The Wealth of Nations, it is considered the first 
modern work of economics. It earned him an enormous reputation and became one of the most 
influential works on economics ever published. Since then, he was considered the father of 
modern economics. 
34 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. 1 
(The Pennsylvania State University: A Penn State Electronic Classics Series Publication, 2005), 
72-3. 
35 For J. Gray, the homo economicus is an opportunistic and calculating individual who 
does not abide by fixed rules. For P. Söderbaum and K. Nyborg, it is a consumer maximizing 
utility or an individual who is pursuing only short-sighted interests. See Faber et al. “Homo 
Oeconomicus and Homo Politicus in Ecological Economics,” 324. 
36 Ibid. 
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socially-driven individual? To what degree, if ever possible, can the homo 
economicus be contributive to the project of praxis of compassion, at least by 
the conception of his natural capacity as a self-interested anthropos? The aim, 
therefore, of this investigation is to forward the locus of anthropos in a 
presumably objectified and reified existence of the homines economici in 
market society. Henceforth, the three foci by which this particular subject 
would be discussed: 1) on the connotations associated with “self-interest” as 
basic motivation of homo economicus, 2) on the issue of the possible 
convergence of the homo politicus and the homo economicus, and 3) on the 
legitimacy of the case of homo economicus in forwarding the thrust of a praxis 
of compassion.  
It has to be noted at the onset that a considerable amount of 
literature that has discussed this coming together of homo politicus and homo 
economicus is usually in the area of ecological economics with a more social 
thrust towards sustainable ecology (nature) in the face of market dynamics, 
thus, the entry of such human models as homo sustinens37 and homo 
ecologicus.38 It is argued that a self-interested model of a person in the 
market, the homo economicus, is not appropriate insofar as sustainable 
development is concerned. There is perceived egoism inherent in the 
dynamics of market anthropos whose intention and behavior serves only 
himself and himself alone. If ever, to some extent, there is a positive 
contribution to the welfare of the ecology, it is mainly accidental and 
perhaps an unintended consequence only.39 So strong is their opposition to 
homo economicus that there is a need to revisit its self-interest motivation. 
 
Homo Economicus as Self-Interested Anthropos: Narrow and 
Rightly-Understood 
 
Adam Smith’s vision of society is “justice and not self-interest.”40 
Smith’s individual, while driven by self-interest, is also capable of sympathy 
as an ethical foundation for a rational behavior in market.41 It is a mistake, 
therefore, a case of oversimplification, to refer to homo economicus as 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 332. 
38 Becker, “The Human Actor in Ecological Economics: Philosophical Approach and 
Research Perspectives,” 20. 
39 See C. Daniel Batson, “Empathy-Induced Altruism: Friend or Foe of the Common 
Good?,” in For the Greater Good of All: Perspectives on Individualism, Society and Leadership, 
Donelson R. Forsyth & Crystal L. Hoyt, eds. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 29.  
40 See Lawrence R. Cima and Thomas L. Schubeck, “Self-interest, Love and Economic 
Justice: A Dialogue between Economic Liberalism and Catholic Social Teaching,” in Journal of 
Business Ethics, 30 (2001), 228. 
41 James D. Marshall, “Varieties of Neo-Liberalism: A Foucaultian Perspective,” in 
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 33:3-4 (2001), 295. 
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reducibly egoistic as many commentators on Smith’s writings had led 
people to think. There are at least two senses by which self-interest is to be 
discerned insofar as Smith is concerned: self-interest as selfishness and 
interest of a self. The former is egoism while the latter may be other-
centered and generous—a view that is also shared by Milton Friedman.42 It 
can be argued, therefore, that while homo economicus may be principally 
motivated by self-interest as such, there are nuances that must be addressed 
insofar as its pure intention is concerned. It is assumed that while the homo 
economicus acts always with self-interest, such behavior may either be 
classified as either “narrow” self-interest or “enlightened” self-interest. Such 
variants need, therefore, to be explicated.  
Self-interest is an anthropological presupposition common to many 
economic models. Mainstream economics today presumes that every action 
taken by the individual is self-interested in the sense that it pursues some 
interest of the self. Thus, both De La Salle University President Bro. Jun 
Erguiza, FSC and a thief along Taft Avenue in Manila are described as 
pursuing their self-interest, even though the former provides a conducive 
environment for quality education among LaSallian students while the 
latter preys upon them. Self-interest is here understood as the interest of the 
self, which could include narrowly selfish or broadly altruistic goals held by 
the actor. The phrase “narrow self-interest” refers to actions in which the 
self (perhaps including a few loved ones near the self) is the intended 
beneficiary of the action while a rather extended sense of self-interest is 
usually employed in terms, such as “enlightened self-interest,” or what 
Alexis de Tocqueville more than a century ago called self-interest “rightly 
understood.”43 
Whether narrow or enlightened, still, the value assumption is that 
every behavior is self-interested—“…that all human action is directed 
toward self-interest. The understanding of what is in the self’s interest may 
change, the understanding of how the self is defined may change, but the 
assumption that all action is directed toward self-interest remains.”44 But as 
to how a self-interested action, given its inherent character in all actions 
thereof, assumes an “enlightened” or “rightly understood” dimension 
remains a question. Batson suggests a number of categories by which the 
self-interest may be enlightened: 1) consideration of long-term 
                                                 
42 “The CEL [classical economic liberalism] concern is that self-interest as other-
centered should not be imposed on the individual by the state. Its concern is not to defend 
selfishness. The issue for Smith and Friedman is how to preserve freedom, not how to protect 
greed.” Emphasis added. Cima and Schubeck, “Self-interest, Love and Economic Justice: A 
Dialogue between Economic Liberalism and Catholic Social Teaching,” 216. 
43 Daniel K. Finn, The Moral Ecology of Markets: Assessing Claims about Markets and 
Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 58. 
44 Batson, “Empathy-Induced Altruism: Friend or Foe of the Common Good?,” 33. 
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consequences, 2) attention to “side payments,”45 and 3) self-categorization 
theory.46  
The first category speaks of the willingness of the homo economicus 
to act in a way that promotes the common good for a short term as an 
instrumental means to maximize self-benefit in the long term. Hence, a 
certain junior professor who is on probationary status for job permanency 
may opt to sacrifice his time to enjoy and have fun with family and friends 
by focusing instead on finishing his dissertation as a requirement for job 
permanency on top of fulfilling his department assignments and extra-
curricular projects—all these in order to maximize the privileges and 
benefits he may receive as a permanent faculty member in the long run.  
The second category deals with the concept of side payment that 
occurs when the homo economicus avoids decisions and actions at the 
expense of the group, especially if others do not do likewise. This he also 
does to spare himself from criticism, accusations, guilt and shame, 
consequently avoiding punishment while anticipating social and self-
rewards. A classic articulation of the often-quoted, “If you can’t beat the 
group, join them” is evident in the case of a newly-hired professor who 
defers his own values and principles against the backdrop of a deeply-
embedded cultural practice and artifact in his workplace in order to gain 
acceptance and eschew termination.  
The third category is on the self-categorization theory that rest on 
the idea that the self can be defined not only at the personal level but also at 
the group level. This is different from the second category (side payments) 
that speaks about acting for the common good, where the self whose benefit 
is maximized is still the personal self, where common good is seen as 
unintended consequence of personal self-interest. Self-categorization theory 
does not challenge the assumption that one always acts to maximize self-
benefit; it only endorses the group identity more than the self. It involves 
suppression of differentiation between the self and other group members as 
individuals.47 
What happens is the individual performs for the group primarily 
because he understands himself as a member of the group, more than 
anything else. This, for him though, is rewarding and thus is still self-
interested in some sense. It is “not me or thee but we.”48 Citing Republic Act 
                                                 
45 “Side payments include nontangible self-benefits of acting for the common good, 
self-benefits such as social and self-approval (e.g., admiration of others; personal pride at a 
good deed done) and avoidance of social and self-punishments (e.g., censure for violation of 
norms of fairness of reciprocity; pangs of conscience).” Ibid., 31-32. 
46 Detailed discussion is found thereafter. Ibid., 31-33. 
47 See J.C. Turner, Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory (London: 
Basil Blackwell, 1987), 65. 
48 Ibid., 83. 
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9335, otherwise known as “Attrition Act of 2005,”49 the members (officials 
and employees) of both the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Bureau of 
Customs (BOC) are expected to contribute to the agencies’ mandate of 
optimizing the revenue collection for a certain fiscal year. Known for its 
corrupt procedures and dishonest individuals, the self-categorization theory 
enjoins every individual to think and act as one unit (group), henceforth, 
maximizing the group benefit as is or more than the self. It is not that the 
BIR or BOC personnel would not get anything in return for personal self-
interest; it is merely that the agency takes precedence over personal gains 
while still being very much motivated by self-interest. In the end, if the 
target allocation is met, a certain percentage of any excess thereof is given to 
the bureaus’ fund as mandated in the said legal provision—understood to 
satisfy the personal self-interested benefits of each member.  
It is, therefore, deduced that from these three manifestations of 
“enlightened” self-interest, the normative character of self-interest rests not 
on its abstract definition alone but on its phenomenological manifestation in 
context, that is, it is overly simplistic and perhaps inconclusive to categorize 
both the actions of Bro. Erguiza and the thief as self-interested without 
critically identifying its world empirically. The moral dimension, therefore, 
of a self-interested act, practiced in economics by the homo economicus, 
should be seen as always in context.50 
There is the dimension of “other” in homo economicus. Briefly, the 
economic anthropos is capable of looking after the other while still being self-
interested. At least on that regard, there is readiness for a more other-
centered behavior – a presumed precursor for a praxis of compassion. 
Hence, the homo economicus can be compassionate. 
 
The Homo Politicus and Homo Economicus: Converging in 
Context 
 
For the second issue on the possible convergence of the homo 
politicus and the homo economicus, it is argued that after an explication of the 
nuances of self-interest as motivational principle of homo economicus and the 
previous categorization of homo politicus as a more socially-directed 
anthropos, there is a point of convergence, a meeting point or a confluence 
                                                 
49 “A Philippine state policy to optimize the revenue-generation capability of Bureau 
of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing a system of rewards and 
sanctions through the creation of the Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue 
Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their 
officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets.” See complete document in <www. 
senate.gov.ph/republic_acts/ra9335.pdf>. Accessed (5 February 2012). 
50 See Finn, The Moral Ecology of Markets: Assessing Claims about Markets and Justice, 
148. 
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between these two anthropoi models. They are, after all, neither essentially 
differentiated nor hostile entities as misconceived by Nyborg and her 
companions in ecological economics. It is clearly assumed, at least in this 
paper, that these two anthropoi are not two existential individuals in actual 
history. They are indeed mere manifestations, essential representations of 
the roles and functions inherent in any human person in a certain context—
market for the homo economicus and political society for the homo politicus. It 
is the one and same individual that may be simultaneously or separately 
manifesting and representing certain functions and roles posed therein by 
the context(s)—market and politics. 
The point of mutual encounter is the ecology of both the homo 
economicus and the homo politicus. Not that they have one and the same 
ecology, although they do at times; it is rather on how the interaction of 
anthropos and context defines both the person and the structure. While the 
main motive of homo economicus is profit (self-interest) and homo politicus, 
generally approved consensus for stable society (justice as fairness), the 
inclination to consider the context (structure, others, common good) is an 
interesting space for meeting together. Accordingly, the homo economicus 
enjoys the profit that is due to him in terms of justice as fairness while still 
being open to formulate conception of the good through acts of donation 
and other forms of altruism in the context of “enlightened self-interest.” 
Similarly, the homo politicus is satisfied with the stability of society through 
mutually consenting individuals while providing platforms for “self-
interested” homo economicus to forward their activities without undermining 
the agreed upon minimum requirements and conditions for the 
preservation of stable society despite differences and autonomy.  
 
Homo Economicus: A Legitimate Agent for Praxis of Compassion 
 
The third issue dwells on the legitimacy of the case of homo 
economicus in forwarding the thrust of a praxis of compassion. Based on 
above analysis, it is henceforth assumed that as manifestations of one and 
the same historical person, homo economicus and homo politicus are efficient 
models of anthropos towards justification of a world of cooperative 
individuals, seen in both its economic and political senses. The primordial 
discovery of this convergence between the economic and political anthropoi 
is the social readiness to acknowledge the presence of the other as a kind of 
extended self, where the enjoyment of any privilege is similar, or at least 
commensurate to one and all, taken individually as members of the same 
anthropological world. No matter what degree of self-interest may motivate 
the homo economicus, the consensus that is built and agreed upon by the 
society of homines politici shields and prevents abuses to take place for the 
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benefit of one, at the expense of the other. The world of homines economici 
may not sustain, as it is not inherent, equality among free individuals; the 
phenomenological presence, however, of abused individuals legitimates 
and justifies the primary thrust of this paper—a praxis of compassion in the 
context of market world. Transcending the world of free and equal homines 
politici, the world created and sustained by unequal homines economici 
necessitates a framework of altruism, generosity, and sympathy among 
others. The eventual differences and inequality in status, resource allocation, 
wealth distribution, and property ownership, among others, generated by 
the conditions inherent in naturally self-interested pursuit of hominess 
economici in any given market situation paves way for a social divide 
between the haves and have-nots. While construed as problematic, such 
inevitable outcome is thus argued as a suitable condition for the exercise of 
compassion by and among self-interested hominess economici, whose task for 
altruism and other-directed actions is not only feasible, but is also inherently 
natural, understood in terms of the “enlightened self-interest” dynamics. 
This is feasible by the nature and dynamics of economic anthropos as capable 
of transcending narrow (selfish) self-interests for the sake of others and the 
group at large. The enlightened self-interest suffices the framework to 
legitimize the claim for a praxis of compassion. 
Smith’s concept of the “invisible hand” provides a theoretical 
commonplace for the possible consensus or dialogue between the political 
anthropos and the economic anthropos. Defined as that “self-regulating nature 
of the marketplace,”51 it is a metaphor that serves to justify that the self-
interested, cost-benefiting and utility-maximizing homo economicus may 
actually contribute to the creation and sustenance of a stable market 
(society), something that the homo politicus would be happy about, even 
though there is no benevolent intention in the former’s egoistic ambitions. 
There is something at work in a universal sense that orders all these various 
individual interests, no matter how differently articulated and realized, to 
contribute and to some extent arrange the exigencies of society towards 
stability. 
 
He [Man] intends only his own security; and by 
directing that industry in such a manner as its produce 
may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own 
gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an 
invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of 
his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society 
                                                 
51 Arthur Sullivan and Steven Sheffrin, Economics: Principles in Action (New Jersey: 
Pearson Prentice Hall, 2003), 32. 
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that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he 
frequently promotes that of society more effectually 
than when he really intends to promote it.52  
 
Its inherent autonomous character, aside of course from its 
“invisibility,” is such that “no individualist capitalist, in theory, is in a 
position to influence the “invisible hand” to the detriment of his 
competitors.”53 If the “invisible hand” dynamics are assumed to allow 
provision of stable society—the same end by which the homo politicus 
operates—there is still much to be argued in terms of the degree of 
intentionality and initiative present between the two anthropoi. It is clearly 
evident that the conception of the stable society in political liberalism is 
achieved by fully-consenting citizens through their concept of “overlapping 
consensus.” On the contrary, the operative character of the “invisible hand” 
does not necessitate and depend on any willful and intentional course of 
action for the society at large. Its dynamics relies on the self-interested 
actions and decisions of the homines economici, wholly unrelated, definitely 
unplanned, but adequate towards ordering and harmonizing these strewn 
personal interests for a stable market society.  
The processes and dynamics of attaining the ordering of stable 
society may be different between the two anthropoi taken in each world 
context, yet mutual dialogue is pertinent inasmuch as both have intentional 
direction towards communal goal. With this finding, it can be argued that 
the anthropos of market, while naturally self-interested, is capable of not only 
an other-directed action but also a communal participation and possibly a 
compassionate-oriented praxis amidst the market dynamics. 
 
Theology and Religious Education Department, 
De La Salle University-Manila, Philippines 
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